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Abstract
This article concerns the privatization of prisons and its consequences 
for the weakening of the state’s monopoly on punishment. It presents 
an analytical overview of arguments for and against the privatization 
of prisons in the light of recent developments in Norway. It concludes 
that the arguments are complex and interwoven and that they rest on 
several value judgments and empirical assumptions.
Artikkelen omhandler privatisering av fengsler. Det redegjøres for 
enkelte generelle trekk ved privatisering av fengsler og fremheves 
forhold som indikerer at privatisering kan bli aktuelt i Norge. Formålet 
med artikkelen er å gi en analytisk fremstilling av argumentene for og 
mot privatisering av fengsler, herunder løfte frem relevante empiriske 
og verdimessige premisser for spørsmålet om privatisering.
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1. Introduction
This article is concerned with questions that arise in case of privatizations 
of prisons and the consequences if the state’s monopoly on the use of pu-
nishment is weakened.1 It contributes to the international debate on prisons 
as institutions by presenting an analytical overview over arguments for and 
against privatization of prisons. The topic is relevant from a Nordic perspective, 
due to some recent tendencies towards privatization in Norway.
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In section 2, we first show that the use of prisons follows from general 
principles concerning the justification for punishment, we also give a brief 
overview of the use of private prisons. In section 3 we address some trends 
which shows that the question of privatization is relevant for Norway. In sec-
tion 4 we present various arguments for and against privatization. Section 5 
provides a summary of the findings.
The main purpose of the article is to systemize relevant arguments from 
the debate on privatization of prisons and to present the arguments within 
a theoretical analytical framework. Our approach is norm descriptive as we 
identify both legal and moral arguments from legal texts and the scholarly 
and public debate. We have limited our self to an eclectic search in the men-
tioned sources, and do not summarize or review existing literature or analyze 
the public and private prison industry.
2. Private prisons
In Western jurisdictions the use of punishment is traditionally justified both 
as retribution and as a tool for social policy. The first line of reasoning relies 
on criminal liability being reasonable and just. The second line of reasoning 
relies on assumptions concerning the benefits of punishment, including as-
sumptions about how the threat of punishment prevents criminal acts (Roxin, 
Arzt, Tiedemann, pp. 4-7). Imprisonment is one of several different forms of 
punishment.
A state can be defined and understood as an institution with monopoly on 
the use of violence, with imprisonment as an extreme representation of the 
state’s sovereign prerogative. A division can be drawn between public driven 
and privatized prisons, out from which is in charge and has the responsibility 
for guarding, security and content. Privatization is in this sense a broad concept 
that implies that an entity other than the state itself is engaged by the govern-
ment to run the prisons, with aims varying from idealistic to profit making.
This division is not a dichotomy as prisons also can be semi-private in the 
sense that guarding and security is operated by the State, and non-coercive 
activities such as kitchen service, laundry, and maintenance are outsourced. 
It is quite common also for public prisons to have some services handled 
by private companies. Hence privatization of prisons can be more and less 
extensive also with regard to the level of state supervision.
The use of private prisons has increased in the world since the 1980s, and it 
seems to have a high level of support in countries of common law although it 
is less popular in countries of civil law (White, p. 134). The percentage of priva-
tized prisons in the USA is around eight (Sawyer and Wagner; The Sentencing 
Project), and around 15 % in United Kingdom (Nowak, p. 122). Semi-private 
prisons you find for example in France (Nowak, p. 128). The increase of the 
private prison sector is explained partly as a result of overcrowding and partly 
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as a result of retributive justice ideology taking over for ideas of rehabilitation, 
and effectiveness (Dolovich, p. 439-440; Nowak, p. 120-121).
The question of private prisons is highly dynamic and there are continuous 
discussions as to whether to increase or decrease its use. This is illustrated by 
the fact that it affected the stock prices for the country’s two largest prison 
companies when Joe Biden was elected as president of the US in 2020 as 
he had pledged during his campaign to end the federal government’s use 
of private prisons (Pauly), which was followed up on January 26th 2021 when 
President Biden sent out the following tweet: “No one should be profiteering 
off of our criminal justice system. That’s why today, I ordered the Department 
of Justice to end the use of private prisons by the federal government” (Biden 
2021). Other examples are that United Kingdom recently placed a large private 
prison under permanent public sector control due to low prison standards 
(HM Chief Inspector of Prisons 2018; HM Chief Inspector of Prisons 2019; UK 
Parliament House of Commons 2019), and that Germany abolished the use 
of semi-private prisons in 2014 (Nowak, p. 128).
3. Trends in Norway
The Nordic countries have a long and strong tradition of public prisons, but 
there are some recent tendencies that indicates that the private privatization 
of this sector may play a larger role in years to come. In the following this 
will be illustrated with three examples from Norway, but discussions about 
privatization are also found in other Nordic countries, for example Denmark 
(Rådet for Offentlig-Privat Samarbejde).
This is not to say anything about representativeness, even though it seems 
reasonable as a hypothesis that the case of Norway could be to a certain de-
gree representative for nearby countries, as there are similarities within other 
parts of the prison system. The Nordic countries are to great extent based 
on the same ideological principles, and there has been an extensive coope-
ration and exchange of ideas within the criminal justice systems. Similarities 
are often clear from a distance, for example the American scholar UN Special 
Rapporteur on Torture 2004-2010 Manfred Nowak writes on rehabilitation:
This simple logic is underlined by the empirical fact that countries with the highest 
standard of prison conditions, such as the Nordic countries in Europe, usually also 
have the lowest recidivism, crime and incarceration rates (Nowak, p. 136).
When we systemize the arguments for and against privatization in section 4 
our focus is the distinction between private and public prisons in its purest 
form. When we in the following point to tendencies towards privatization 
in Norway we however also point to private features within public prisons. 
Partly because these are in themselves exceptions from the state’s sovereign 
prerogative and might be indicators for a state’s potential and willingness to 
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privatize, and partly because some of the arguments for privatization are of 
relevance to such features, for example there are legal regulations on govern-
ment procurement and the obligation to issue public tenders that opens a 
potential shift between traditionally idealistic service providers such as The 
Red Cross or The Salvation Army and private profit oriented entities.
The Norwegian Correctional Service has the responsibility for and run all 
prisons, and according to the so-called import model other crucial services 
are delivered to the prison by other government agencies, such as medical, 
educational, or library services: “The cooperation shall contribute to a coor-
dinated effort to cover the needs of convicted persons and inmates and to 
promote their return to society” (The Execution of Sentences Act section 4).
However, there is also a long and strong tradition of some services from 
private actors. For example, the prison authorities have over years from the 
Salvation Army acquired housing services where around thirty detainees train 
for living and work. In addition, the state budget has of 2020 a specific post 
for private organizations with a direct funding of 25 million NOK and funding 
through the Norwegian Correctional Service of 2 million NOK (Justis- og 
beredskapsdepartmentet 2020, p. 13). These are not large numbers, but in a 
budget which is lowered in recent years they are not insignificant either.
A first indication which imply more use of private actors in the future was 
the statement by the Government in 2013 that they wanted to: “Increase the 
use of voluntary and non-profit organizations in the criminal justice system, 
both during imprisonment and when returning to society” (Political platform). 
Also the harsh critique of the use of isolation during pretrial and sentencing, 
is from The Norwegian Correctional Service partly met by an initiative that 
invite private persons and institutions to apply for funding:
An important challenge for the prison authorities is that many inmates spend a large 
part of the day alone on their own cell. There is a need to strengthen the services 
offered to inmates who for various reasons feel “isolated”. KDI wants to prioritize 
cooperation with organizations that will make an effort in this are (Kriminalomsorgs-
direktoratet).2
Secondly there has recently been privatization in the sense that a prison has 
been administered by another state. The government concluded that there 
was a need to increase prison capacity and in 2015, Norway’s Parliament 
(Stortinget) amended the Execution of Sentences Act by adopting a new Se-
ction 1a, which provided legal authority for transferring inmates to serve their 
sentences in another state with which Norway has entered into an agreement, 
it is stated that a convicted person who serves a sentence in another state 
2  “En viktig utfordring for kriminalomsorgen er at mange innsatte tilbringer en stor 
del av døgnet alene på egen celle. Det er behov for å styrke tilbudet til innsatte som 
av ulike grunner opplever å være ´isolert .́ KDI ønsker å prioritere samarbeidet med 
organisasjoner som vil gjøre en innsats på dette område”. Our translation. 
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“is considered to be imprisoned in Norway and shall [ ... ] have the rights and 
obligations arising from this” (The Execution of Sentences Act section 1a).
In 2015 the parliament also consented to an Agreement with the Nether-
lands on renting places at Norgerhaven Prison for the execution of sentences 
for persons convicted of criminal offences in Norway. This was a fully equip-
ped prison with Dutch personnel and administrative staff. The prison had a 
capacity of 242 inmates and was operated from September 2015 until August 
2018. It was stipulated that the execution of the sentence shall be regulated 
by Norwegian legislation and subject to Norwegian administration, and it 
was managed by a prison governor and a deputy prison governor, both of 
whom are Norwegian. However, The Agreement between Norway and the 
Netherlands stated that the receiving State shall provide “the staff necessary 
to implement the cooperation agreement” and that transport on Dutch ter-
ritory to and from the prison must be carried out by Dutch officers and that 
Dutch instructions for the use of force in prison applied (Kingdom of Norway 
and the Kingdom of the Netherlands).
Thirdly privatization is on the political agenda and there are political initi-
atives that signals privatization. The Norwegian Progress Party (Fremskritts-
partiet) is a libertarian right-wing political party. The party was a part of a 
center-right government coalition from 2013 until it withdrew in January 2020. 
During their time in government, they had the Minister of Justice. Their Party 
Manifesto stated: “The Progress Party wants to abolish the queue for impri-
sonment. This can be done [ ... ] by allowing private actors to build and own 
prisons on behalf of the state” (Fremskrittspartiet, p. 51).3 And it also says: 
”The Norwegian Progress Party wants to buy prisons cells abroad” (Frems-
krittspartiet, p. 51).4 These proposals are considered serious and have been 
discussed and criticized by the labor movement (Håkonsen 2016a). There are 
also companies with interest in a private prison marked that has stated that 
they could provide necessary services on very short notice (Kjernli E.).
4. Arguments for and against privatization
4.1. Introduction
In the following we address the question whether the authority to deprive a 
person of their freedom in order to enforce criminal law should be handled 
exclusively by the state, or whether this authority could be delegated to a 
private enterprise. This question has been debated within different jurisdic-
tions (Field; Robbins; White, pp. 134-145; Dolovich; Henry). One can identify 
four lines of reasoning that will be elaborated on in the following, institutional 
3  “Fremskrittspartiet vil holde soningskøene nede. Dette kan blant annet gjøres ved å 
la private aktører bygge og eie fengsler på oppdrag fra staten”. Our translation.
4  “Fremskrittspartiet vil […] kjøpe soningsplasser i utlandet”. Our translation.
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arguments (section 4.2), human-rights arguments (section 4.3), arguments of 
utility (section 4.4) and arguments of jurisdiction (section 4.5).
4.2. Institutional arguments
The essence of the institutional argument is that prisons belong to the core 
of a state’s sovereign function. It rests on modern political philosophy and 
the idea that states are obliged to protect both personal security and public 
order, often advocated with reference to The Rule of Law. The premise is 
that generally formulated norms which constraint individual and institutional 
behavior, for example principles of generality, universality and separation of 
powers, only will be effective within a legal and political transparent entity:
The idea of freedom from sovereignty that the rule of law claims, requires that the 
sovereign have definite limits, that when an institution or person acts, we can know 
clearly if it or she is the sovereign. Who, otherwise, is to be restrained from whom? It 
is in this manner that rule of law norms presuppose the clear segregation of state from 
civil and domestic society and of public from private realms (White, p. 119).
A formal expression of this idea is to be found in the Grundgesetz für die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland article 33 (4), that rules that exercise of sove-
reign authority on a regular basis shall “be entrusted to members of the 
public service who stand in a relationship of service and loyalty defined by 
public law.” The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany has concluded that 
derogations from this principle should be limited to exceptional cases and 
only when it is justified by an objective reason (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
paragraph 144-146). The court has made it clear that prison sentencing is an 
essential part of the state functions:
The implementation of detentions imposed under criminal law belongs to the core 
functions of sovereign power. In that respect, there is no relevant difference, be it in 
view of the intensity of potential interferences with fundamental rights or otherwise, 
between forensic treatment and the execution of prison sentences [ ... ]. In such a con-
text, a person endowed with coercive powers in its interactions with inmates exercises 
a sovereign function even if in most cases – precisely because of these powers – he 
or she does not have to issue official orders or use direct force to implement them 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht, paragraph 153).
Private prisons violate the constitutional non-delegation doctrine and is pro-
hibited under the Grundgesetz, which probably also will be the case under 
Austrian law (Nowak, p. 130). However, this does not categorically exclude the 
possibility of exceptions if there are very good reasons for such an arrange-
ment. In the case referred above the court accepted a privately run psychiatric 
prison, but the company was owned by the state and was not operating for 
profit. The reason for privatization was to maintain the organizational coope-
ration between forensic and other psychiatric facilities. Thus, there was state 
supervision of the practice, and other safeguards as well (Bundesverfassungs-
gericht, paragraph 155 following).
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4.3. Human rights arguments
Human rights are moral principles or norms that describe certain standards 
of human behavior, and with reference to national and international law it 
has been argued that private prisons are not compatible with human rights 
obligations. Obviously, a state can’t avoid its constitutional or international 
obligations by delegating state functions to private actors, the question is 
whether the obligations limit the possibility to use private actors. One can 
distinguish between different aspects of the argument, as it relates to A) 
human dignity, B) specific human rights for prisoners or C) the potential for 
human rights violations.
Ad A: The concept of human dignity is based on a recognition of human 
beings possessing a value intrinsic to being human and as such should be 
respected. There are states that guarantee for the citizen’s human dignity 
in their constitutions, which can shed light over how the argument unfolds. 
Israel Supreme Court has ruled that the use of private prisons will violate the 
right to “human dignity” (The Supreme Court of Israel). The government of 
Israel wanted to establish a prison operated and managed by a private cor-
poration, but the Supreme Court held with a majority vote that it would be a 
disproportionately intervention in the right to human dignity and therefore 
unconstitutional (The Supreme Court of Israel, paragraph 36 to 39). The pre-
mises rested on three aspects: First that the desire of the private corporation 
operating the prison to make a financial profit turns the prisoners into a means 
to an end; reflects a lack of respect for the status of the inmates as human 
beings (The Supreme Court of Israel, paragraph 28). Secondly the invasive 
character of the powers that the private concessionaire and its employees are 
to exercise. Thirdly the symbolic significance of imprisonment in a privately 
managed prison will have.
Ad B: In the debate on privatizations of prisons one may find arguments 
referring to specific human rights, however they are seldom specified. Several 
international conventions contain rights that protect prisoners, for example the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights article 10 nr. 3 states “The 
penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim 
of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation.” This and similar 
obligations on restorative justice does not in itself prohibit the use of private 
companies but might limit to what extent a state can regulate sentencing out 
of purely economic motives when sentencing.
Ad C: All modern states guarantee for Humans rights both in national and 
according to international law and thereby have a so-called positive obligation 
to protect their citizens from Human Rights violations. It has been argued that 
the use of private prisons increases the risk of Human rights violations, for 
example, the UN Human Rights Committee has stated their concern about 
whether the use of private prisons in New Zeeland challenges obligations 
under the Human Rights:
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[I]t [ ... ] remains concerned about whether the practice of privatization, in an area 
where the State is responsible for protecting the rights of persons whom it has de-
prived of their liberty, effectively meets the obligations of the State party under the 
Covenant and its own accountability for any violations (Human Rights Committee).
Whether or not there is an actual risk is an empirical question. Some empi-
rical studies indicate that the risk for violations can be higher in private than 
in public prisons. For example, it has been reported to be more violence in 
private prisons than in public prisons in England and Wales (Grierson J. and 
Duncan P.).
4.4. Arguments of utility
The utility arguments address whether and to what extent the purpose of pu-
nishment can be secured with private prisons, and therefore depends on the 
reasons for the use of punishment. It emphasizes that the question of public 
vs. private administration of justice first and foremost needs to be discussed 
and analyzed through the prism of criminal law as it gives the premises for 
the use of punishment (Guruli 2020).
The use of punishment is, as stated in section 2, justified partly as retribution 
and partly as a tool for social policy. The first line of reasoning relies on crimi-
nal liability being reasonable and just, and the second relies on assumptions 
concerning the benefits of punishment, including assumptions about how 
the threat of punishment (general prevention) and positive influence over the 
prisoner during the imprisonment (special prevention) helps to prevent crimi-
nal acts. In Norway the use of punishment is primarily justified by the second 
line of reasoning, and as pointed out in section 4.3 the states are obliged to 
secure reformation and social rehabilitation according to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights article 10 nr. 3.
The utility arguments used in favor of private prisons are that they are effe-
ctive and less costly and innovative (Rådet for Offentlig-Privat Samarbejde), 
and that they provide a practical solution to intermediate problems such as 
overcrowding. One example of this line of reasoning is the following statement 
from a spokesman for the Norwegian Progress Party discussing privatization 
with the labor movement:
Competition usually results in cheaper and better operation. If you have two who 
come up with an offer, you get a completely different dynamic [ ... ] It is a condition 
that others who run prisons or prison transport do so under given conditions. There 
must be no hocus pocus. We have already opened up the monopoly to voluntary 
actors like the Salvation Army (Håkonsen 2016b).5
5. “Konkurranse gir som regel en billigere og bedre drift. Har du to som kommer med 
et tilbud, får du en helt annen dynamikk [...] Det er en forutsetning at andre som skal 
drive fengsler eller fangetransport gjør det under gitte premisser. Det må ikke være 
noe hokus pokus. Vi har allerede åpnet opp monopolet til frivillige aktører som Frel-
sesarmeen.” Our translation.
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Arguments of utility used against private prisons seems to presuppose that 
there is an inherent contradiction between the quality of services of any kind 
and the private contractors’ financial self-interests or profit motive (Henry, p. 
198-199), in addition to an increased risk for corruption and limited responsi-
bility and control. For example, there has been argued that the private prison 
industry has no interest in decreasing recidivism as that would undermine 
business (Guruli 2020). The strength of such arguments will depend on the 
contractor’s incentives and criteria for evaluation defined by the government 
and whether and to what extend the ends are controlled (Ministry of Justice 
United Kingdom).
The utility arguments are to some extent derived from more general per-
spectives and views on which role the government should have regulating 
and guiding market economies. This might also explain the growth of private 
prisons, as the privatization seems to be more extensive in countries that are 
generally thought to be marked oriented economy and with an ideology that 
limit state intervention in the marked.
One must then also take into account macro perspectives such as globaliza-
tion and formal binding economic models for the states. The states obligation 
on public procurement might for example affect what until now has been a 
stable relationship between the government and some private actors, such 
as cooperation between the prison authorities and idealistic organizations, 
since the procuring authority are legally obliged to issue public tenders to 
secure marked competition when the value of the procurement exceeds a 
certain threshold, and this might result in commercial actors outcompeting 
the idealistic organizations providing services for the prisons.
4.5. Arguments related to jurisdictions
Private prisons are sometimes located in a different jurisdiction than the 
contracting state, either between national states or between different ju-
risdictions under a federal state, and such arrangements might give rise to 
legal uncertainty regarding the control over the imprisoned person and the 
sentencings content. Hence this argument addresses how jurisdiction has an 
effect on the A) institutional, B) human rights and C) utility arguments (Nerbø).
Ad A: When Norway executed sentences in the Netherlands from 2015-2018, 
it was unsuccessfully argued for the High Court that it was a breach of The 
Norwegian Constitution article 106 which states: “Norwegian citizens may not 
be refused entry into the realm” (Borgarting). The case shows that sentencing 
abroad at least touches upon some underlying institutional values. It was not 
brought in for the Supreme Court apparently due to lack of relevance.
Ad B: The Norwegian Parliamentary Ombudsman, who has a mandate to 
prevent human rights violations, visited and evaluated the Dutch prison. The 
conclusion was that the inmates weren’t guaranteed adequate protection 
from the Norwegian authorities, as they lacked the possibility to investigate, 
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prosecute and punish violations of the prohibition against torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment:
In certain situations, another state’s authorities are permitted use of coercive measu-
res, including weapons, against inmates who have been convicted in Norway. From a 
preventative point of view, a solution of this kind, in which the Norwegian authorities 
are prevented from fulfilling their responsibility to protect inmates, entails a risk of 
torture and ill-treatment (Sivilombudsmannen 2016).6
Ad C: The use of a Dutch prison has also been criticized for being incompa-
tible with the purpose of the sentence as a restorative process, as it limits 
the possibilities for measures that are likely to counteract new criminality, 
such as going on leave and receiving visitors (Nerbø). The Ombudsman 
also found that The Norwegian authorities did not conduct a satisfactory 
review of how the medical rights of the inmates were safeguarded by Dutch 
health legislation.
5. Conclusion
The arguments for and against the use of private prisons are complex and 
rest on several value judgments and empirical assumptions. It is therefore 
important, for a start, to make clear the goals of imprisonment and consider 
under which system, if any, or combination of systems, the goals are best 
reached. In the present article we have not intended to take a stand in the 
discussion of whether or not prisons should be operated by private entities, 
but we have highlighted arguments anyone with an interest should take in 
consideration. This might be necessary also in the Nordic countries, at least 
in Norway we have seen a political and practical positive attitude towards 
privatizing within the prison system. To sum up one might say that Norway is 
at a crossroads, understood partly normative-descriptively as a meeting place 
between different institutional ideas, partly as a distinct change of practice, 
and partly normatively as a point in time and space where decisions on further 




6. For the following discusion see Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet (2017) and 
 Sivilombudsmannen (2017). 
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